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Milk quotas were introduced in 1984 to the EU dairy market to control the structural 
surpluses resulting from imbalances between supply and demand for milk encouraged by 
subsidies to the sector. These quotas were abolished on the 31st of March 2015 leaving the 
sector to operate closer to free market conditions. Milk in the UK is marketed through 
contracts and the purpose of this paper is to analyse, using time series methods, to what 
extent market factors are driving the observed evolution of UK contract prices. The five 
groups of contracts considered are: retailers’ aligned contracts, standard liquid contracts, 
A&B contracts, cheese manufacturing contracts and other manufacturing contracts. Results 
indicate that, although market factors play a role in influencing all contract prices, their effect 
is different by type of contract, and quota abolition does not have a significant effect on the 
time series behaviour of contract prices. 
 
JEL codes: M31, L11 
 




The purpose of establishing EU dairy quota was to control the oversupply of milk that would 
affect market prices and the amount of support needed for the sector (European Commission, 
2015). Since its elimination in March 2015, the dairy sector has been increasingly operating 
Page 1 of 44
John Wiley & Sons































































under market forces. All this has coincided with a context of international events such as the 
closure of Russian markets for EU food products, the reduction in demand for dairy products 
in China and other Asian economies, as well as the production expansion in New Zealand 
and the United States (Giles, 2015).    
 
The elimination of the quota has triggered a number of analyses focused on its potential 
effects. Groeneveld et al. (2016) studied how likely the quota abolition is to lead to more 
intensive farms in the Netherlands, and the potential impact of legislation introduced to 
prevent it. Samson et al. (2017) studied the environmental impact of potential increases in 
milk production in Netherlands due to the quota elimination. Salou et al. (2017) analysed the 
effects of the quota elimination on the distribution of dairy production across various 
production systems in France. Another topic analysed has been that of how conflicts arising 
because of the quota abolition, such as the so-called ‘German Milk Conflict’ Alpmann and 
Bitsch (2017) developed between two farm organisations representing opposite interests on 
the common policy debate, namely market liberalisation versus regulation.  In addition, 
Kersting et al. (2016) studied how a tradable/non-tradable production quota could influence 
firm entry and exit to/from the German dairy market.  This paper’s focus on the analysis of 
contract prices will contribute to the literature on the quota abolition impact on farm prices.  
Understanding price behaviour has been pointed out as a critical element to decision making 
in uncertain conditions, and that can influence significantly the returns of dairy market 
participants (Bjørn & Li, 2016)
 1
. Bergmann et al. (2015) analysed the European Union (EU) 
farmgate prices after the 2003 reform focusing on average prices in Germany, Ireland and the 
                                                
1
 Note that what Bjørn and Li (2016) called the “world milk” price is not a measure of 
farmgate milk prices but an aggregate of three different milk price indicators (weights in 
parentheses): skimmed milk powder and butter (35 per cent); cheese and whey (45 per cent) 
and whole milk powder (20 per cent) (p. 1). 
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EU. A similar analysis was carried out by Nicholson and Stephenson (2015) in the US also 
using average milk prices.  
 
This paper’s approach differs from the aforementioned studies due to the fact that it focuses 
on analysing contract prices instead of the average United Kingdom (UK) milk price. Whilst 
an analysis similar to the above studies could have been carried out based on average milk 
price data, that would have been too aggregated as milk in the UK is marketed through 
contracts and each one has a different price. Moreover, although in the UK the period after 
the elimination of the milk quota has been characterised by a decreasing trend in the average 
price of milk (as observed in all EU farmgate milk prices across the EU), when disaggregated 
milk contract prices are observed, they show significant heterogeneity (with some of them 
growing), reaching up to 18 pence per litre in August 2015, when the average price was 23.3 
pence per litre. This situation has raised concern about whether the average milk farmgate 
price for the UK calculated by Defra was a good indicator of the general trend of overall 
farmgate prices (AHDB, 2015).   
 
The objective of this study is to empirically examine what factors are driving the prices 
observed in dairy contracts in the UK. Given the large number of factors along the dairy 
supply chains that could affect farmgate prices, the main goal of this paper is to understand to 
what extent market variables such as domestic production, world production, prices for final 
products affect contract prices, and moreover, whether the elimination of quota has 
represented a structural change in the relationships between the aforementioned variables and 
the contract prices. Specific questions to be addressed are:  
 
• What are the factors influencing the prices in different milk contracts in the UK? 
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• How downstream wholesale and retail prices are transmitted to farm gate milk prices and 
whether this has changed after the end of the quota system? 
• Are there differences between the ways in which market variables affect the different 
contract prices? 
 
The analysis was based on an assembled database of standardised monthly contract prices for 
the period 2004 to 2016 that are published by the UK Agricultural and Horticultural 
Development Board (AHDB). For the analysis, contracts were aggregated into five 
categories: contracts aligned to retailers, standard liquid contracts, A & B contracts
2
, cheese 
manufacturing contracts and other manufacturing contracts.   
 
The paper proceeds with a brief overview of the UK dairy sector, followed by data and 
methods, discussion of results, and conclusions.   
 
2. An overview of the dairy sector in the UK 
 
According to Giles (2015) the dairy sector in the UK is going through a period of high 
uncertainty because of retailers’ price wars, the increasing alignment of domestic dairy prices 
with world prices, which have been reducing milk prices, and also because of the elimination 
of the milk quota in March 2015, which has exposed the sector to market forces. . Figure 1 
presents the real and nominal average milk price in the UK (Defra prices) as well as the 
minimum and maximum nominal price observed for milk. The decrease in real milk prices 
shown in Figure 1 is a reflection of how competitive the sector has become and the increasing 
                                                
2
 The A&B milk contract are comprised of two prices: the ‘A’ price is set in advance and is 
generally based on returns achieved in the processor’s core markets. ‘B’ price is paid for 
excesses or shortfalls in production (or ‘B’ volumes) and is determined from actual market 
returns or spot trade in most cases (AHDB, 2016a).   
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competition from other food products (such as fruit juices, cereal bars) due to changes in food 
purchasing patterns (Foster & Lunn, 2007). 
 
Note that the situation shown in Figure 1 can vary enormously due to the fact that most dairy 
producers are tied to contracts that often specify which retailers they will supply. Whilst the 
three nominal price indicators have become relatively close to one another over time’, 
approximately since the beginning of 2014 the difference between the maximum and 
minimum milk contract price has increased significantly. 
 
Figure 2 portrays the evolution of the per capita purchases of milk and dairy products 
(excluding cheese), and cheese. Whilst the evolution of cheese purchases shows a moderately 
increasing trend, the purchases of milk and dairy products have shown a strong decline 
(particularly during the 1970’s and 1980’s). This decline is mostly explained by the decrease 
in the consumption of full fat milk, only partially replaced by semi-skimmed and skimmed 
milk, likely due to changes in consumption patterns (e.g., motivated by healthier 
consumption and substitution by products such as juices) (Foster & Lunn, 2007).   
 
Figure 2 here 
 
On the supply side, the observed contraction of the dairy products market (most of the UK 
dairy products are destined for the domestic market) has been followed by what is called a 
structural adjustment of the sector, depicted in Figure 3. Both the number of dairy cows and 
dairy holdings in the UK have decreased steadily by 23 per cent and 57 per cent since 1995, 
respectively. The trend is associated with an increase in the herd size per holding (AHDB, 
2016a). 
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Figure 3 here 
 
Despite the fact that the number of dairy holdings and dairy cows has been decreasing, this 
has not been strongly reflected in the production of milk, which has remained stable (Figure 
5). This is due to the fact that the average production of milk per cow has been increasing 
steadily at a rate of 1.6 per cent per year (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
The concentrated structure of retailing is an important characteristic of the UK food market 
(AHDB, 2016a). As shown in Table 1, the top five retailers (i.e., Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda, 
Morrisons and The Co-operative) represent over 70 per cent of the sales of liquid milk and 
cheese, which are the two main dairy categories on the UK market.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Both retailers and manufacturers establish contracts with farmers. In the case of retailers, 
these contracts are carried by manufacturers (e.g., the processor Arla has contracts with 
farmers who produce exclusively for retailers Tesco or Sainsbury’s). Another interesting 
characteristic of the contracts is their confidential nature (even between farmers) preventing 
detailed comparisons amongst contracts besides prices paid.  
 
Although somewhat dated, the MDC (2005) report pointed out that contracts provided by 
milk buyers made farmers unresponsive to actual market’s needs reducing profits for 
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everyone, particularly farmers. Specific problems with some contracts included: “[1] 
Contracts which do not pay farmers on the basis of what the customer wants/needs or on the 
basis that the customer buys the milk. Often contracts reflect the pooling of overall milk sales 
rather than specific market needs; [2] prices which are set by looking at unimportant or 
varying market indicators (lack of transparency); [3] contracts which incentivise level supply 
by more or less than the value of that level supply to customers; [4] farmers who compound 
these problems by not maximising the price they get from contracts; [5] milk prices which 
can be changed at short notice or retrospectively without the option of the farmer ceasing to 
supply that customer” (MDC, 2005, p. 1). 
 
After farmers staged a series of protests and blockades during 2012 (BBC, 2012), UK dairy 
farmers and processing firms reached an agreement on a voluntary code of practice for future 
contracts for milk supplies (NFU, NFUS & Dairy UK, 2012). The agreed code aims to 
address a number of long standing issues with dairy contracts (such as those mentioned 
above) in a way that works for both producers and purchasers. However, according to the 
NFU “[…] following the launch of the voluntary code, we have seen a number of positive 
moves by processors, however contractual problems still remain and that’s why we are 
urging our dairy members to take a close look at any contracts they may be offered” (The 
Northern Echo, 2016). In February 2017, the NFU launched a contract checking service for 
farmers looking for legal advice on contract issues.  
 
In summary, it is not clear from the scarce evidence available what factors drive the price 
offered to farmers in contracts. In the absence of information on the structure of the contracts 
(i.e., what determines the final price), this paper takes an empirical approach to investigate 
the major drivers.   
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3. Empirical work 
 
The purpose of this section is twofold: first, to present the main features of the dataset used 




The analysis was executed on a database of contract prices for the period 2004 to 2016, 
assembled using information provided and published online by the UK Agricultural and 
Horticultural Development Board (AHDB). The selected period of analysis was based on 
data availability (i.e., no data on contract prices were available before 2004). 
 
The contract prices are based on the AHDB Dairy Standard Litre, which standardises the 
milk content (i.e., butterfat, protein, bacterial and somatic cell counts both per millilitre) 
when computing the contract prices, and therefore allows a comparison between different 
contract prices. This is based on 1 million litre/year producer on every other day collection 
(EODC) unless every day collection (EDC) is available on a profile equivalent to the UK 
national average profile of the past three years. Monthly variations for constituents, volume 
and hygiene are based on UK averages over the prior three milk years. The AHDB Dairy 
standard litre is reviewed in April each milk year to examine whether the standard litre 
currently being used needs to be amended. This will depend on whether significant changes 
in the pattern of milk production have taken place (AHDB, 2016b). 
 
Page 8 of 44
John Wiley & Sons































































The dataset was augmented with information about wholesale prices for downstream 
products such as skimmed milk powder, butter and cream and also information about the EU 
production and production statistics from outside the EU (Argentina, Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States).  
 
Data on the actual UK raw milk farmgate price and wholesale prices for downstream 
products such as skimmed milk powder, butter, cream, and cheddar cheese were sourced 
from Defra. Data on the EU internal market prices for raw milk, skimmed milk powder, 
butter, cream and different types of cheese were compiled from the EU Milk Market 
Observatory. Finally, UK retail price indices for milk butter and cheese were from the Office 
for National Statistics.  
 
It should be noted that it is not possible to analyse each of the observed contract prices 
because of contracts changing frequently.
3
 Therefore, following AHDB approach, it was 
decided to group the contracts into five categories: contracts aligned to retailers (liquid milk 
going to specific retailers, e.g., Tesco), standard liquid contracts (liquid milk contracts not 
associated to retailers), A&B contracts (see footnote 1), cheese manufacturing contracts, and 
other manufacturing contracts (milk destined to dairy products other than cheese, e.g., 
yoghurt, ice cream). Note that in the case of AHDB data, the last two categories are merged 
into one, i.e., “manufacturing contracts”.  
 
                                                
3
 For instance, since 2004 the database records a total of 152 different contracts with a 
monthly average of 65 contracts and a standard deviation of 13.5. Whilst Wensleydale 
contract price (for cheese) and Wyke Farms (standard liquid) have been observed for the 
entire sample, Dairy Crest, Arla and Muller have been introducing and replacing contracts 
frequently during the sample period.  
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Quantities traded under each contract are not available and therefore it was not possible to 
compute weighted averages of contract prices; simple averages were used instead
4
. Despite 
this, the evolution of the contract prices in our analysis is similar to that of contract prices 
presented on the AHDB website. Figure 5 presents the evolution of the different contracts 
groups. Note that, although they show some differences, all contract prices seem to follow 
roughly similar trends up to approximately March 2015, when the quota ended.  
 
Figure 5 here 
 
The starting point of the time series analyses is the descriptive analysis of the data, in 
particular whether the variables are stationary. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 
data used in the analysis, and information about the stationarity of the variables, obtained 
using the Phillips-Perron test (Phillips & Perron, 1988). This test proposes a non-parametric 
method of controlling for serial correlation when testing for a unit root. The results indicate 
that the dataset is made of a combination of I(0) (i.e., stationary in levels) and I(1) variables 
(i.e., stationary in first differences).   
 
Table 2 here 
3.2. Methods 
 
Similar to other papers on milk prices (e.g., Bjørn & Li, 2016; Bergmann et al., 2015; 
Nicholson & Stephenson, 2015), the approach used in this paper is empirical and based on 
the symmetric autoregressive distributed lag approach (ARDL) to cointegration introduced 
by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and developed by Pesaran et al. (2001).   
                                                
4
 As regards the classification of contracts, see AHDB website 
(http://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/market-information/milk-price-calculator/). 
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Using this method to test for long run equilibrium has a number of advantages compared with 
previous methods such as those used in Engle and Granger (1987), Phillips and Hansen 
(1990) or Johansen and Juselius (1990). The ARDL is based on the estimation of the 
Unrestricted Error Correction Model (UECM) and therefore it is appropriate when having 
I(0) and I(1) variables.  
 
The method can be used with small samples producing robust results and allows estimating 
the error correction model with just linear transformation, obtaining the long run relationships 
between time series, and eliminating serial correlation. The symmetric ARDL regression can 
be defined as follows:  
 












Where, ty is the dependent variable; jty −  are  lags of the dependent variable and jtx −  are 
explanatory variables other than the lags of ty , which can have lagged and current values. 
The terms p and q indicate the number of lags of the dependent and other explanatory 
variables, respectively; α , 
jϕ  and jθ  are coefficients, and tε is an error term. 
 
The Bounds testing approach (Pesaran et al., 2001) was used to test for the existence of long 
run relationships among variables. The unrestricted error correction equation to be used in the 
Bounds test is as follows:  
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− ∑∑∑  
 
Where 0β  is the intercept, 1β  and jβ  correspond to the long run relationships parameters, jγ  
and jϕ  capture the short run dynamics of the model, and tν  stands for the error term.  
 
The Bounds testing procedure involves the estimation of equation (2) by ordinary least 
squares and the performance of two separate tests on the estimated coefficients. First, an F-
test examining the null hypothesis that 01 =β  and 0j =β  (no cointegration) against the 
alternative that 01 ≠β  and 0j ≠β  (cointegration), and second, a t-test examining the null 
hypothesis that 01 =β  (no cointegration) against the alternative that 01 ≠β  (cointegration).  
 
The distributions of the F- and t-statistics under the null hypotheses are non-standard as they 
depend on the order of integration of the underlying time series (Pesaran et al., 2001). To 
address this problem, Pesaran et al. (2001) provide two sets of critical values: a lower value 
assuming that all regressors are I(0), and an upper value assuming that all regressors are I(1). 
Consequently, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted if the respective sample test 
statistic is below the corresponding lower critical value. By contrast, the null hypothesis is 
rejected if the test statistic exceeds the relevant upper critical value. In cases where the test 
statistic is in-between the two bounds, the results are inconclusive (Adämmer et al., 2016). 
 
In order to ease the interpretation of the ARDL equations, they were expressed in terms of 
error correction equations as in (3): 
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Where the term ρ  represents the speed of adjustment, links the long run with the short run 
adjustment process. When the ECT coefficient (i.e. ρ ) is negative and statistically significant 
it indicates an adjustment of the dependent variable towards its long run equilibrium; the 
larger the magnitude of the ECT coefficient, the higher the speed of the adjustment to shocks.  
 
It is important to highlight that the small sample available after the quota elimination (i.e., 
April 2015 to October 2016) makes it difficult to test structural change in the behaviour of 
the contract prices. Therefore, three complementary approaches were considered: First, a 
Chow test was performed (Chow, 1960) comparing the results for the period September 2013 
to March 2015 with the post quota period (April 2015 to October 2016)
5
. Second, additive 
and multiplicative dummies were used to test whether there was a departure from the 
estimated ARDL equation (i.e., equation 1). This was done by estimating equation (4): 
 



























jtjt xyxyy4  
Where qδ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-quota period and 0 
otherwise. The tests, therefore, were based on the null hypotheses of qα , qjϕ  and qjθ  being 
equal to zero. Lack of rejection of those null hypotheses imply no change in the ARDL 
parameters.  
 
                                                
5
 Whilst a much larger pre-quota sample could have been chosen, the choice of the period 
September 2013 to March 2015 was to match the same number of months of the post-quota 
period. 
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The third method consists in using rolling regressions for the sample period ending in 
February 2009 with a window of 20 months (i.e., the number of periods of the post-quota 
sample). For each contract group price, Equation 1 was estimated 93 times and the 
parameters plotted over time to observe their stability. The choice of February 2009 was due 
to data availability: for example the New Zealand (NZ) milk production data were only 
available since 2007.  
 
The choice of variables entering the contract price equations was motivated by economic 
theory. Based on information provided in section 2, it is assumed that processors negotiate a 
contract price (and probably other milk features, although we do not have information about 
it) with farmers based on market factors, and their own market expectations. This could be 
illustrated in a stylized model where the first order condition solving the processor’s profit 
maximizing problem is: 
 











Where PP is the price of the processed good (i.e., a dairy product like cheese), MQ is the 
quantity of milk transformed by the processor, ( )⋅f  is the production function of the 
processed product and w is the negotiated contract price for milk. From the farmer’s profit 
maximization, the supply of milk is given by the first order condition (6): 
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Where ( )⋅C  is the farmer’s cost function that depends on the feed price FP and the level of 
output MQ (which in this simple case is equal to the processor utilisation).  
 
At the equilibrium, one has  


















Thus, factors affecting positively both the price of the processed product and the expectations 
on the demand for the processed product should lead to an increase in the price paid for milk 
(i.e., the contract price) and an increase in the price of feed should provide the same effect as 
it would increase the milk marginal cost of producing milk.
6
 In addition, expectations 
regarding an excess of milk supply should lead to lower contract prices. Of course, the simple 
model shown in equations (5) to (7), does not provide any information about the contract 
price dynamics, which needs to be discovered empirically. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
The following section presents and discusses the results of the estimation of models for each 
of the five different types of contract prices, discussion also results of alternative model 
specifications to test for the stability of the parameters over time (Chow-tests, a model with a 
post-quota dummy interacted with the explanatory variable, and rolling regression models). 
                                                
6
 Note that the equilibrium condition (7) aims to highlight the potential variables being 
introduced in the bargaining between producers and processors. In a more formal setting 
(Salanié, 2005), the same problem could be represented by a Stackelberg game where the 
“principal” (i.e., the processor) offers the “agent” (i.e., the farmer) a contract (e.g., a milk 
price) that takes into consideration the agent’s decision process and maximises the principal’s 
pay off. The action taken by the farmer consists of delivering the milk to the processor and 
the bargaining process ends with the agent delivering or not the milk.  
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4.1 ARDL estimation results 
 
Since an ARDL model can be estimated via least squares regression, the standard Akaike 
Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973) was used for model specification selection. . All 
variables presented in Table 3 were potentially considered for the estimation of the equations 
but only the ones with statistically significant coefficients were included in the final model 
specification.   
 
Although the contract prices are based on the AHDB Dairy Standard Litre, and not on farm-
gate prices, the average UK farm gate milk price and the UK milk production were replaced 
by fitted terms obtained regressing these variables on a series of exogenous variables, in 




The residuals of all equations were tested for normality using the Jarque-Bera test (Jarque & 
Bera, 1981), for autocorrelation employing the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test 
(Godfrey, 1988), and for the existence of a long-run relationship using Bounds tests (Pesaran 
et al., 2001). In addition, recursive coefficients were also computed to evaluate whether they 
were converging smoothly as the sample size increased. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the ARDL models in terms of the error correction form. Model 
diagnostics are presented at the bottom of the table. The overall model fit was good and the 
different tests did not reveal presence of autocorrelation or non-normality of the residuals. 
Furthermore, the results of the Bounds tests for cointegration rejected the null hypothesis of 
                                                
7
 In both regressions the instruments used were lags of the UK raw milk price, UK, New 
Zealand, Australia and USA milk production. 
Page 16 of 44
John Wiley & Sons































































no cointegration for all regressions. Most of the recursive coefficients showed smoothly 




The upper panel of Table 3 presents the short run dynamics of the ARDL equations. This is 
followed by the error correction adjustment coefficient (i.e., the coefficient associated to the 
error correction variable) and the lower panel of Table 4 shows the long-run terms.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
As shown in Table 3, each contract seems to follow different dynamics, which is expected 
since all contract prices respond to the needs of different milk uses. Moreover, the prices also 
had different seasonal patterns as shown by the seasonal dummies (dummy-month in Table 
3). The values of the adjustment coefficients are all negative and statistically significant 
ranging from -0.463 for the A&B contracts to -0.164 for the “manufacturing others” 
contracts. This indicates that past disequilibria take more than a period to being incorporated 
into prices. 
 
The short term dynamics shown in Table 3 indicate that a number of factors affect the current 
change in contract prices. From all the non-UK variables, only EU variables and New 
Zealand’s production variable seem to have some effect on the contract prices. Whilst one 
should expect the EU variables to affect the UK market, New Zealand production variable 
have to be related to expectations on the world market. Note that coefficients associated with 
changes in production from the US, Australia or Argentina were not found statistically 
significant and therefore those variables removed from the equations.     
                                                
8
 Recursive estimates of the coefficients are not presented in the paper but are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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Table 3 also shows that the coefficient associated to the lagged dependent variable, 1ticePr − , 
was statistically significant for all contracts irrespective of the period of analysis. Moreover, 
in three of five equations the coefficient of the second lag of the dependent variable, 2ticePr −
, was also statistically significant. This indicates that all the contract prices have a large 
degree of persistence.   
 
The long term results in Table 3 shows the expected signs for all estimated coefficients, 
namely, the response of the contract prices is positive to an increase in the average price for 
milk and the cost of production (i.e., price of compound feedingstuff) and negative to 
changes in milk production. There were, however, two exceptions: the response to EU milk 
production, and the response to New Zealand milk production, were both positive for the 
aligned contract prices. The coefficients of the UK processed products prices, e.g., wholesale 
Cheddar cheese prices, were found to be positive and significant for the manufacturing 
cheese contract prices. 
 
Also, an increase in the New Zealand milk production was found significant and negative for 
the A&B contracts but not for the aligned contracts. Now we turn to the analysis of factors 
driving the prices in each contract:  
 
Retailers’ aligned contracts 
 
Table 3 shows that the UK average milk price has a significant relationship with the retailers’ 
aligned contract price (0.23 and 0.284 for the short and long term coefficients, respectively), 
whilst the relationship with milk production was found significant only in the short term (the 
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long term coefficient, although negative, is not significant). The positive relationship with the 
UK average price may be associated to the indication that contracts reflect the pooling of 
milk rather than factors associated to the final use of milk (MDC, 2005). 
 
The price of the compound feeding-stuff (i.e., feed costs) was found to have a positive 
relationship with the retailers’ aligned contract price but only in the long term (the coefficient 
was 0.26), which may indicate that these contracts compensate farmers for the increase in 
their costs of production (Farmers’ Weekly, 2015). The fact that the coefficient of the EU 
average farm-gate price was found to be statistically significant and positive (0.79) indicates 
that milk imports play a role on the determination of the retailers’ aligned contract price.  
 
Standard liquid contracts 
 
The response of the price for the standard liquid contracts to increases the UK price of raw 
milk was found positive (see Table 4) , with a statistically significant  long term coefficient 
equal to 0.55, indicating that the pooling of overall milk sales is important for the price 
offered to farmers. Similar to the retailers’ aligned contracts, the response of the price under 
the standard liquid contract price was positive, with a statistically significant coefficient for 
the compound feedstuff price equal to 0.19 in the short term and 0.42 in the long term, which 
means that production costs are one of the drivers of those prices.  It should be noted that the 
coefficient of the downstream price of milk in the UK (retail price) was not found to have a 
statistically significant relationship with standard liquid contracts prices, and neither were the 
coefficients of the changes in the production or prices from abroad (i.e., Argentina, Australia, 
EU, New Zealand and USA).    
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For the case of A&B contracts, Table 3 shows that an increase in the UK raw milk prices has 
a positive impact on the contract price with a coefficient of 0.53 in the short term and 1.38 in 
the long term (both coefficients being statistically significant) showing, again, the potential 
effect of milk pooling. In contrast with the other liquid milk contracts (i.e., retailers’ aligned 
and standard liquid), the coefficient of the downstream price (i.e., UK retail milk price) was 
found positive and statistically significant in the short term (0.37), and negative and 
statistically significant only for the period pre- abolition of the quota (-0.53).  
 
The coefficient of production costs (represented by the price of the compound feedstuff) was 
found not to have a statistically significant effect on A&B contract prices. From all the 
potential international factors only changes in New Zealand milk production was found to 
influence the price offered in the A&B contract showing a negative long term coefficient  (-
0.10).  Finally, an interesting result was the negative and statistically significant long term 
coefficient for the use of milk on the production of cheese and cream in the UK (-0.21 and -
0.42, respectively). This may indicate that the price offered to farmers is also driven by the 
competition with other dairy activities.  
 
Manufacturing cheese contracts 
 
The coefficient of the UK price of raw milk was found significant and with a positive effect 
on the contract price being equal to 0.32, in the short term and 0.53 in the long term, showing 
again the potential effect of milk pooling and not reflecting the specific requirements of 
cheese producers. In fact, the price of cream was not found explaining the price of this 
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contract in a statistically significant way.  Similar to the case of A&B contracts, changes in 
production costs do not seem to affect the price paid under this contract type neither in the 
short nor the long term.  Downstream prices were found to have a positive effect on the price 
of this contract, with an estimated long term elasticity with respect to the UK wholesale 
cheddar price equal to 0.47.  With respect to international influences on the contract price, the 
coefficient of the EU milk production was the only one found to have a negative and 
statistical significant effect i only in the short term (-0.07).  
 
Manufacturing others contracts 
 
According to Table 3 the response of the contract price of other manufacturing products to an 
increase in the UK farm-gate milk price was positive and equal to 0.20 in the short term and 
0.72 in the long term. Moreover, an increase in the UK milk production was found to have a 
negative long term effect on the contract price equal to -1.72. These results indicate that the 
price offered under this contract also responds to milk pooling and not necessarily to the 
particular requirements of the industry. A negative response to the increase in the EU milk 
production was found significant only in the short term (-0.05). No international variable was 
found influencing the contract price.  
 
4.2 Chow test results 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the Chow test for a structural change in parameters between 
the period previous to the elimination of the quota and the post quota period (both sample 
being the same size). The results of the test indicate that, at the 5 per cent level of 
significance, there seems to be a structural change after the quota elimination only in the 
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standard liquid contracts model. Note, however, that these results are also affected by the 
small sample size considered and do not provide any additional information on the source of 
the structural change (i.e., what coefficients were affected by the abolition of the quota), 
which are discussed below.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
4.3 Model with pre- and post-quota specific coefficients  
 
Table 5 presents the results of the ARDL models estimated interacting a post-quota dummy 
with all the covariates in the model. The results indicate clearly that in the cases of retailers’ 
aligned, standard liquid and manufacturing others contracts are no differences in the 
parameters before and after the quota elimination.  
 
For A&B contracts, the only two statistically significant post quota coefficients were on the 
use of milk for cream and the seasonal dummy corresponding to April. For manufacturing 
cheese contracts, post quota changes were found in three coefficients, namely those 
associated to: the second lag of the contract price which became more negative (the elasticity 
decreases by -0.66), the coefficient of the UK average raw milk price lagged one period, and 
the seasonal dummy corresponding to September. From these results it is clear that the 
elimination of the quota did not affect significantly the contract price equations presented in 
Table5 
 
Table 5 here 
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4.4 Rolling regressions  
 
Table 6 and Figures 8 to 10 present the results of the rolling regressions for selected 
parameters of the ARDL equations.
9
 As mentioned, the equations were estimated with a 
sample of 20 observations, i.e., of the same size of the post-quota sample. The months in the 
x-axis of the figures correspond to the ending month of the sample, i.e., the last point presents 
estimates for the post-quota sample. The dotted line in the figure corresponds to April 2015 
and represents the period when post-quota observations start entering into the regressions. It 
is important to note that a sample period of 20 month is not necessarily a large sample for 
estimating the parameters of a model that contains variables that are non-stationary. 









In general, it is difficult to discern a pattern in the figures as all of them show a great degree 
of volatility of the estimated coefficients (only few of the estimated parameters showed 
coefficients of variation below 50 per cent). Interestingly, the volatility of the coefficients can 
also be seen in the evolution of the seasonal dummy variables. It is possible that this observed 
volatility may be reduced as more observations become available for the post-quota period. 
                                                
9
 Figures with the evolution of all the coefficients (i.e., including seasonal dummies, trends 
and intercepts) from the rolling regression can be found in an online annex. 
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The parameters are very volatile and this provides evidence to the fact that a number of 
factors affecting the contract prices change in importance over time with some frequency. 
This aspect has already been mentioned in the dairy literature as it brings the issue of lack of 







The purpose of this paper has been to study determinants of dairy contract prices in the UK 
market. Because of milk in the UK being marketed through contracts, and also because of the 
elimination of the EU quota, the different contract prices have diverged significantly from the 
average milk price.  
 
Using an autoregressive distributed lag approach (ARDL) approach, the results show that 
market factors do influence contract prices and that, for most part, their effect is different by 
type of contract, with each contract adjusting at different speeds to previous periods’ shocks. 
The results also indicate that some of the issues of milk contracts highlighted elsewhere in the 
literature still remain. The fact that the average UK milk price is an important component of 
the observed contract prices implies that contract prices reflect the pooling of overall milk 
sales rather than specific factors related to the specific customer market served. Contract 
prices seem to depend also on a number of factors which seem to change in importance over 
time, as shown by the rolling regression results, which has been mentioned in the literature as 
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lack of transparency in the contracts. Moreover, the results also seem to indicate that the 
elimination of the quota has not had a significant impact on the behaviour of the contract 
prices.  
 
However, it is important to highlight that a limitation of this study is the short period 
available to analyse the effects of the elimination of the milk quotas on the different contract 
prices. Additional data could allow for estimating rolling regressions models with larger 
samples or modelling the post quota period separately from the pre-quota period. Another 
possible avenue to improve the results of this paper is that of obtaining more accurate 
information about the actual characteristics of the different contracts, and developing 
structural models of how contract prices are determined. In fact, contracts between farmers 
and downstream agents in the supply chain can deliver the required stability and increase the 
integration along the supply chain; however, to ensure that they fulfil their purpose a more 
detailed analysis of their features is needed.  Under the new post-quota setting in which 
farmers seem to be more exposed to the vagaries of the market, there is an increasing need to 
deliver tools or propose devices to reduce producers’ exposure to market changes. Such 
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Figure 1: UK - Maximum, minimum contract prices, Defra average milk price (in 
nominal and real terms) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on AHDB and Defra information. 
Note: The dotted line indicates the end of the dairy quota in March 2015. 
 
Figure 2: UK weekly per-capita consumption of milk and dairy products (excluding 
cheese) and cheese.  
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Figure 3: UK - Dairy farms/holdings and dairy cows 
 
Source: AHDB and Defra. 
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Figure 5: UK - Evolution of contract prices by group for the period 2004 to 2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on AHDB data. 
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Table 1. Great Britain retailing of liquid milk and cheese - Value market shares (%) 
  Liquid milk    Cheese 
  2014 2015 2016  2014 2015 2016
Top 5 retailers 1/ 70.5 70.1 69.4 78.0 76.1 73.3
Total hard discounters 2/ 6.5 7.3 8.4 8.1 10.2 12.0
Total independents and symbols 3/ 4.2 4.1 3.5 0.7 0.6 0.6
Total bargain stores 4/ 0.5 0.4 0.4 -- -- --
Milkman 6.9 7.0 6.8 -- -- --
Other retailers 11.5 11.3 11.5 13.2 13.1 14.1
                
Source: AHDB, Kantar Worldpanel data. 
Notes: 
1/ Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda, Morrisons and The Co-operative. 
2/ Aldi and Lidl 
3/ Small retailers e.g., Costcutter, Premier. 
4/ Small retailers e.g., One Pound Store. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the used variables 
 
Variables Original units 1/ Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min Max Levels First diff.
P-P 2/ Sig P-P 2/ Sig
Price aligned ppl 153 3.28 0.18 2.87 3.54 -1.77 0.39 -8.49 0.00
Price cheese ppl 153 3.16 0.19 2.83 3.53 -1.86 0.35 -7.25 0.00
Price standar liquid ppl 153 3.15 0.19 2.80 3.50 -1.75 0.40 -6.74 0.00
Price other manufacturing ppl 153 3.17 0.19 2.82 3.56 -1.87 0.35 -7.43 0.00
Price A&B liquid ppl 153 3.14 0.20 2.70 3.48 -1.80 0.38 -9.06 0.00
UK milk production million litres 153 7.04 0.07 6.89 7.24 -5.52 0.00 - -
UK condensed milk production million litres 153 3.97 0.44 3.24 4.54 -2.62 0.10 -4.76 0.00
UK milk powder production million litres 153 5.35 0.54 3.95 6.23 -1.30 0.61 -3.43 0.02
UK butter production million litres 153 3.10 0.14 2.75 3.43 -6.16 0.00 - -
UK cheese production million litres 153 5.72 0.11 5.40 6.01 -4.97 0.00 - -
UK cream production million litres 153 3.15 0.13 2.88 3.42 -4.13 0.00 - -
UK yougurt production million litres 153 3.17 0.20 2.81 3.48 -1.84 0.36 -20.55 0.00
UK butter price £/tonne 153 7.78 0.25 7.40 8.24 -1.82 0.37 -7.22 0.00
UK SMP price £/tonne 153 7.48 0.24 7.07 7.94 -2.10 0.25 -7.42 0.00
UK mild cheddar price £/tonne 153 7.97 0.15 7.74 8.20 -1.13 0.70 -7.13 0.00
UK mature cheddar price £/tonne 153 7.84 0.17 7.55 8.15 -1.62 0.47 -6.84 0.00
UK bulkcream price £/tonne 153 7.00 0.26 6.62 7.57 -2.24 0.19 -8.82 0.00
UK raw milk price ppl 153 3.17 0.20 2.82 3.54 -1.74 0.41 -8.13 0.00
EU butter price £/tonne 153 8.27 0.17 7.75 8.70 -2.64 0.09 -6.00 0.00
EU SMP price £/tonne 153 10.27 0.23 9.78 10.92 -1.96 0.31 -5.49 0.00
EU WMP price £/tonne 153 8.14 0.20 7.60 8.65 -2.35 0.16 -6.02 0.00
EU Cheddar price £/tonne 153 8.29 0.17 7.83 8.61 -2.08 0.25 -8.81 0.00
EU Edam price £/tonne 153 8.24 0.15 7.91 8.66 -2.14 0.23 -6.33 0.00
EU Gouda price £/tonne 153 8.24 0.16 7.87 8.65 -1.95 0.31 -6.46 0.00
EU Emmental price £/tonne 153 8.62 0.12 8.31 8.82 -0.50 0.89 -11.46 0.00
EU WP price £/tonne 153 6.80 0.35 5.95 7.52 -2.56 0.10 -8.00 0.00
EU-15 raw milk price £/tonne 153 6.02 0.14 5.63 6.35 -2.03 0.27 -7.12 0.00
EU milk production million litres 153 9.35 0.10 8.64 9.56 -3.51 0.01 - -
EU drinking milk production million litres 152 7.87 0.04 7.78 7.96 -10.08 0.00 - -
EU cream production million litres 153 5.34 0.12 4.28 5.54 -4.78 0.00 - -
EU skimmed milk powder production million litres 153 4.49 0.31 2.98 5.14 -3.03 0.03 - -
Compound feedingstuff price Index (base 2010) 153 4.60 0.23 4.21 4.94 -1.38 0.59 -12.64 0.00
Feed wheat price Index (base 2010) 153 4.61 0.33 3.98 5.20 -1.55 0.51 -10.33 0.00
Feed barley price Index (base 2010) 153 4.67 0.32 4.09 5.29 -1.65 0.46 -11.51 0.00
Feed oats price Index (base 2010) 153 4.66 0.39 4.01 5.53 -1.57 0.50 -15.59 0.00
New Zeland milk production million litres 113 6.97 1.05 4.49 8.07 -3.90 0.00 - -
Australia milk production million litres 111 6.63 0.20 6.36 7.00 -4.05 0.00 - -
USA milk production million litres 115 8.89 0.05 8.78 9.01 -5.19 0.00 - -
Argentina milk production million litres 112 6.71 0.12 6.43 6.93 -4.70 0.00 - -
UK retail millk price Index (base 1987) 153 5.40 0.13 5.15 5.52 -1.96 0.30 -11.10 0.00
UK retail butter price Index (base 1987) 153 5.50 0.26 5.12 5.83 -1.14 0.70 -13.95 0.00
UK retail cheese price Index (base 1987) 153 5.36 0.14 5.13 5.54 -1.334305 0.61 -15.47 0.00
Notes:
1/ All the variables in the table are in logarithms.
2/ P-P denotes the Phillips-Perror test.
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Table 3. Results of the estimation of error correction equations and cointegration tests 
Milk contract prices
Aligned Standard liquid A&B Manufacturing cheese Manufacturing others
Coeff. St. dev. Sig. Coeff. St. dev. Sig. Coeff. St. dev. Sig. Coeff. St. dev. Sig. Coeff. St. dev. Sig.
Short term coefficients 1/
  Price (t-1) 0.230 0.079 0.004 0.531 0.061 0.000 0.272 0.056 0.000
  UK raw milk price 0.262 0.054 0.000 0.528 0.107 0.000 0.324 0.067 0.000 0.202 0.085 0.018
  EU 15 raw milk price (-1) 0.098 0.070 0.160
  Compound feedingstuff price 0.040 0.063 0.530 0.185 0.073 0.013 0.176 0.085 0.039
  UK retail milk price (t-1) 0.371 0.208 0.079
  UK milk production 0.067 0.037 0.069
  EU Cheddar price 0.141 0.053 0.009
  UK use of milk in cheese -0.117 0.059 0.051
  UK use of milk in cream 0.152 0.044 0.001
  EU milk production -0.065 0.025 0.012 -0.045 0.161 0.781
  EU milk production (t-1) 0.268 0.089 0.003
  NZ milk production 0.017 0.004 0.000 0.050 0.020 0.014
  NZ milk production (t-1) -0.036 0.015 0.024
  dummy - February 0.016 0.011 0.139
  dummy - March 0.039 0.011 0.000 -0.003 0.022 0.886
  dummy - April -0.049 0.007 0.000 -0.028 0.006 0.000 -0.032 0.013 0.014 -0.057 0.010 0.000 -0.003 0.014 0.848
  dummy - May -0.036 0.008 0.000 0.011 0.013 0.409
  dummy - June 0.033 0.007 0.000 0.062 0.013 0.000
  dummy - July 0.032 0.007 0.000 -0.182 0.074 0.016 0.064 0.010 0.000 0.075 0.024 0.003
  dummy - August -0.043 0.009 0.000 -0.189 0.066 0.005 0.035 0.018 0.052
  dummy - September 0.031 0.006 0.000 0.029 0.008 0.000 0.024 0.019 0.216
  dummy - October 0.016 0.006 0.013 0.028 0.009 0.003 0.016 0.019 0.399
  dummy - November 0.015 0.012 0.204
  dummy - December 0.035 0.009 0.000 -0.004 0.017 0.804
  Trend 0.000 0.000 0.046
Error correction adjusment -0.332 0.056 0.000 -0.207 0.067 0.002 -0.463 0.071 0.000 -0.221 0.045 0.000 -0.164 0.050 0.001
Long run coefficients
  Intercept 6.140 1.005 0.000 -0.504 0.371 0.177 4.822 1.252 0.000 -3.633 1.892 0.057 9.466 3.168 0.003
  UK raw milk price 0.284 0.064 0.000 0.550 0.159 0.001 1.381 0.074 0.000 0.529 0.141 0.000 0.722 0.242 0.003
  EU 15 raw milk price -0.521 0.334 0.121
  Compound feedingstuff price 0.260 0.072 0.001 0.421 0.177 0.019 0.136 0.194 0.484
  UK wholesale mature Cheddar price 0.471 0.156 0.003
  EU Cheddar price 0.715 0.285 0.013
  UK retail milk price -0.527 0.199 0.010
  UK milk production -0.021 0.235 0.930 -1.722 0.560 0.003
  UK use of milk in cheese -0.210 0.098 0.035
  UK use of milk in cream -0.417 0.087 0.000
  EU milk production 0.798 0.256 0.002 0.147 0.149 0.325
  NZ milk production 0.008 0.009 0.393 -0.095 0.027 0.001
Statistics Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig.
Number of observations 112 151 111 151 150
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.61 0.56 0.73 0.66
Jarque-Bera 1.28 0.53 0.87 0.65 1.01 0.60 3.99 0.13 1.45 0.48
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 0.28 0.76 1.43 0.24 0.30 0.74 0.50 0.61 1.14 0.32
ARDL Bounds Test 1 438.37 0.00 292.90 0.00 730.37 0.00 46644.54 0.00 539.49 0.00
ARDL Bounds Test 2 0.33 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.16 0.00
Log likelihood 317.53 378.69 235.11 386.94 369.91
Note: 1/ Coefficients of variables in differences.
Page 36 of 44
John Wiley & Sons



































































Milk contract prices Sum of squared errors Degrees Degrees F Sig.
Both Period 0 Period 1 of of test
periods freedom 1 freedom 2
Aligned 0.0054 0.0001 0.0036 13 14 0.4740 0.9062
Standard liquid 0.0098 0.0011 0.0019 12 16 3.0393 0.0202
A&B 0.0482 0.0011 0.0204 12 16 1.6670 0.1680
Manufacturing cheese 0.0086 0.0004 0.0015 15 10 2.3213 0.0910
Manufacturing others 0.0083 0.0001 1/ 0.0003 19 2 2.5375 0.3203
Notes: Period 0 is September 2013 to March 2015 and Period 1 is April 2015 to October 2016. 1/ x10000.
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Table 5. Estimated coefficients of regressions with interactive quota dummies 
 
Milk contract price equations
Aligned Standard liquid A&B Manufacturing cheese Manufacturing others
Coeff. St. dev. Sig. Coeff. St. dev. Sig. Coeff. St. dev. Sig. Coeff. St. dev. Sig. Coeff. St. dev. Sig.
Coefficients
  Price (t-1) 0.857 0.116 0.000 1.289 0.081 0.000 0.624 0.068 0.000 0.891 0.068 0.000 0.720 0.062 0.000
  Price (t-2) -0.157 0.102 0.128 -0.565 0.064 0.000 -0.144 0.062 0.022
  UK raw milk price 0.322 0.079 0.000 0.498 0.071 0.000 0.315 0.073 0.000 0.225 0.061 0.000
  UK raw milk price (t-1) -0.229 0.093 0.016 0.172 0.073 0.020 -0.191 0.078 0.015
  Compound feedingstuff price 0.077 0.029 0.009 0.100 0.028 0.001 0.186 0.081 0.024
  Compound feedingstuff price (-1) -0.165 0.084 0.053
  UK wholesale mature Cheddar price (-1) 0.128 0.029 0.000
  UK retail milk price (t-2) -0.203 0.054 0.000
  EU 15 raw milk price (-2) -0.025 0.041 0.542
  EU Cheddar price 0.069 0.031 0.027
  UK use of milk in cheese -0.089 0.034 0.011
  UK use of milk in cream -0.116 0.028 0.000
  UK milk production 0.049 0.038 0.196
  UK milk production (t-2) -0.236 0.067 0.001
  EU milk production -0.156 0.048 0.002
  EU milk production (t-1) 0.164 0.049 0.001 0.395 0.092 0.000
  EU milk production (t-2) -0.170 0.083 0.043
  NZ milk production 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.026 0.013 0.044
  NZ milk production (t-1) -0.014 0.004 0.001 -0.078 0.032 0.017
  NZ milk production (t-2) 0.016 0.010 0.108
  dummy - February 0.011 0.007 0.112 0.034 0.010 0.001
  dummy - March 0.044 0.011 0.000 0.041 0.010 0.000
  dummy - April -0.050 0.008 0.000 -0.030 0.007 0.000 -0.011 0.010 0.281 -0.045 0.010 0.000 -0.022 0.009 0.016
  dummy - May -0.029 0.009 0.001 0.024 0.013 0.058
  dummy - June 0.035 0.007 0.000 0.066 0.014 0.000
  dummy - July 0.029 0.007 0.000 -0.101 0.052 0.054 0.054 0.009 0.000 0.119 0.017 0.000
  dummy - August -0.039 0.010 0.000 -0.115 0.048 0.018 0.068 0.013 0.000
  dummy - September 0.029 0.007 0.000 0.013 0.008 0.091 0.055 0.012 0.000
  dummy - October 0.011 0.007 0.111 0.027 0.009 0.002 0.046 0.011 0.000
  dummy - November 0.030 0.009 0.002
  dummy - December 0.036 0.009 0.000 0.027 0.009 0.004
  Trend 0.000 0.000 0.102
  Intercept -1.545 0.469 0.001 -0.127 0.083 0.128 1.836 0.349 0.000 -1.249 0.322 0.000 1.282 0.424 0.003
Coefficients multiply by quota dummy
  Price (t-1) 0.111 0.330 0.736 -0.073 0.409 0.859 -0.066 0.128 0.605 -0.190 0.259 0.465 -2.270 1.579 0.153
  Price (t-2) -0.149 0.291 0.610 0.189 0.264 0.475 -0.662 0.161 0.000
  UK raw milk price -0.009 0.189 0.961 0.244 0.336 0.469 0.347 0.189 0.069 1.728 1.477 0.244
  UK raw milk price (t-1) 0.124 0.300 0.680 -0.200 0.270 0.460 1.009 0.433 0.021
  Compound feedingstuff price -0.322 0.295 0.277 -0.413 0.280 0.143 0.390 0.683 0.569
  Compound feedingstuff price (-1) 1.148 1.068 0.284
  UK wholesale mature Cheddar price (-1) -0.166 0.161 0.303
  UK retail milk price (t-2) 0.001 1.298 0.999
  EU 15 raw milk price (-2) 1.075 0.666 0.109
  EU Cheddar price 0.508 0.528 0.339
  UK use of milk in cheese -0.022 0.288 0.938
  UK use of milk in cream -0.471 0.116 0.000
  UK milk production 0.143 0.289 0.622
  UK milk production (t-2) -2.556 1.568 0.106
  EU milk production 0.159 0.059 0.008
  EU milk production (t-1) 0.496 0.263 0.063 -0.163 0.396 0.681
  EU milk production (t-2) -0.471 0.301 0.120
  NZ milk production 0.022 0.016 0.183 0.091 0.065 0.168
  NZ milk production (t-1) -0.015 0.011 0.188 -0.185 0.184 0.318
  NZ milk production (t-2) 0.086 0.062 0.168
  dummy - February 0.026 0.025 0.289 -0.159 0.149 0.288
  dummy - March -0.099 0.056 0.077 0.022 0.079 0.782
  dummy - April 0.005 0.020 0.809 0.021 0.021 0.314 -0.164 0.028 0.000 -0.009 0.028 0.764 -0.183 0.117 0.121
  dummy - May -0.031 0.030 0.310 0.008 0.079 0.924
  dummy - June -0.018 0.024 0.442 -0.018 0.094 0.846
  dummy - July 0.018 0.025 0.457 -0.305 0.327 0.354 0.030 0.031 0.332 0.092 0.145 0.525
  dummy - August -0.035 0.026 0.172 -0.293 0.252 0.249 0.062 0.102 0.544
  dummy - September 0.012 0.018 0.506 0.072 0.020 0.001 0.040 0.097 0.684
  dummy - October 0.035 0.019 0.063 0.022 0.029 0.461 0.038 0.097 0.693
  dummy - November -0.023 0.048 0.628
  dummy - December 0.021 0.037 0.566 0.079 0.079 0.319
  Trend -0.002 0.002 0.407
  Intercept -4.462 2.818 0.117 2.458 1.932 0.206 1.209 4.814 0.802 4.140 1.984 0.039 1.855 5.324 0.728
Statistics
Adjusted R-squared 0.973 0.988 0.980 0.992 0.988
Log likelihood 323.552 385.903 274.841 419.941 391.939
F-statistic 160.066 536.804 234.174 679.341 346.482
Significance (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 6. Results of rolling regressions 
 
Regression Statistic Coefficients 1/
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
r1lc2 r2lc2 lpmuki r1lpmuki lcfs lqmuki r1lqmeu lqnz r1lqnz d4 d5 d8 Intercept
Regression 1 Mean 0.62 -0.35 0.33 -0.04 0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 1.47
St. dev. 0.37 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.25 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 1.55
CV (%) 59.53 -83.60 136.00 -931.57 230.23 -148.07 -604.84 123.53 -115.70 -90.64 -113.05 -99.80 105.32
r1lc5 r2lc5 r1lpmuki lcfs d2 d4 d6 d7 d9 d10 t Intercept
Regression 2 Mean 1.03 -0.56 0.47 0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.17
St. dev. 0.44 0.22 0.61 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.74
CV (%) 42.67 -39.17 128.77 375.81 57.60 -90.22 163.34 51.89 47.45 120.20 -885.98 -994.79
r1lc1 lpmuki r2lrpifm lqcuk r2lqcruk lqnz r1lqnz r2lqnz d4 d7 d8 Intercept
Regression 3 Mean 0.42 0.71 -0.09 0.00 -0.13 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.49
St. dev. 0.31 0.30 0.74 0.13 0.25 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.20 4.39
CV (%) 72.92 41.70 -809.95 -23500.16 -188.06 280.91 -485.03 517.40 -207.33 -1110.81 -504.33 903.82
r1lc3 r2lc3 lpmuki r1lpmuki r1lpmacuk lqmeu r1lqmeu r2lqmeu d3 d4 d7 d9 d10 d12 Intercept
Regression 4 Mean 0.52 -0.17 0.33 0.19 0.25 -0.14 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.28
St. dev. 0.36 0.17 0.53 0.52 0.32 0.17 0.34 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 3.06
CV (%) 69.43 -99.87 161.24 264.83 127.73 -126.52 -498.64 2816.76 1363.21 -203.49 83.40 236.40 691.25 420.57 1108.21
r1lc4 lpmuki r2lprmeu lpceu lcfs r1lcfs r2lqmuki d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 d11 d12 Intercept
Regression 5 Mean 0.05 0.84 -0.09 -0.06 0.29 -0.43 0.52 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -1.57
St. dev. 2.71 3.12 1.30 0.91 2.11 2.47 2.65 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.43 0.51 0.70 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.12 0.15 11.17
CV (%) 5686.54 371.73 -1405.92 -1468.92 728.85 -575.93 507.59 -1160.91 -1055.99 -653.97 -374.03 -435.62 -653.80 -661.56 -829.49 -1431.23 789.83 -2994.84 -711.27
Notes: Regression 1=Aligned; Regression 2=Standard liquid; Regression 3=A&B; Regression 4=Manufacturing cheese; Regression 5=Manufacturing other.
1/ The prefix 'r1l' stands for first difference of the logarithm, 'r2l' stands for second differece of the logarithm and 'l' stands for logarithm of the variabl .
Variables
c1      = Contract price - A&B d2      = Seasonal dummy - February
c2      = Contract price - Aligned to retailers d3      = Seasonal dummy - March
c3      = Contract price - Standard manufacturing cheese d4      = Seasonal dummy - April
c4      = Contract price - Standard manufacturing others d5      = Seasonal dummy - May
c5      = Contract price - Standard liquid milk d6      = Seasonal dummy - June
pmuki   = Price of milk UK d7      = Seasonal dummy - July
cfs   = Compound feedingstuff price for livestock d8      = Seasonal dummy - August
rpifm   = Retail price index fresh milk d9      = Seasonal dummy - September
qnz     = Quantity produced of milk New Zealand d10     = Seasonal dummy - October
pmacuk  = Wholesale price of mature Cheddar UK d11     = Seasonal dummy - November
qmeu    = Quantity of milk collected EU d12     = Seasonal dummy - December
prmeu = Price of cow's raw milk of EU 15 t = trend
pceu    = Price of Cheddar EU
Page 39 of 44
John Wiley & Sons































































Figure 6. Rolling regression coefficients - Aligned contracts 
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Figure 7. Rolling regression coefficients - Standard liquid contracts 
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Figure 8. Rolling regression coefficients - A&B contracts 
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Figure 9. Rolling regression coefficients - Manufacturing cheese contracts 
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Figure 10. Rolling regression coefficients - Manufacturing other contracts 
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